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War, 1945-1970 
 
This article examines how effectively Britain secured its diplomatic 
communications against hostile decryption during the early Cold War. It shows 
that between 1945 and 1970 the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office introduced and operated four advanced cipher machines, Typex, Rockex, 
Noreen and Alvis, which produced very strong ciphers. However, Britain did 
suffer physical compromises of Rockex through Soviet espionage and an attack 
on the British embassy in Beijing. Rockex was also vulnerable to technical 
surveillance of its acoustic and Tempest emissions and the Soviets exploited this 
to read the encrypted communications of the British embassy in Moscow.  
In recent years there has been a blossoming of literature on Western signals intelligence 
(Sigint) in the Cold War. Ground breaking books by Richard Aldrich, Matthew Aid and 
Stephen Budiansky have revealed much about the activities of the main British and American 
Sigint agencies, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the National 
Security Agency (NSA).1 However, while the significance of Cold War Sigint is starting to 
be understood, comparatively little has been written about the other side of the story; the 
attempts by Britain and other Western states to protect their own communications from 
interception and decryption. In his book on GCHQ and in a separate article Aldrich has 
briefly discussed the British communications security agencies and two Cold War cipher 
machines.2 John Ferris and Christopher Smith have also written important essays on the 
development of the Typex and Rockex cipher machines in the Second World War and the 
improvement of British signals security.3 But so far there has been no detailed analysis of 
how Britain secured its diplomatic communications in the early Cold War. Yet this was a 
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vital task, for as Ferris observed: ‘Governments have as much to gain from defending their 
own secret messages as attacking those of foreign states – if not more.’4  
One way to approach this topic is to investigate the cipher machines used in the early Cold 
War by the two British diplomatic services, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office (CRO). For many years these machines were shrouded in official secrecy 
but fresh document releases by GCHQ, the NSA and the Foreign Office’s Communications 
Department have put more information about them into the public domain. Drawing on these 
and other sources, this paper will show that between 1945 and 1970 the Foreign Office and 
the CRO operated a series of technologically advanced cipher machines (Rockex, Typex, 
Noreen and Alvis) and shared these machines with several Commonwealth states.5 The 
article will then assess whether these cipher machines were able to protect British diplomatic 
communications against hostile decryption in the early Cold War. It will argue that while the 
cipher machines could apparently resist a purely cryptanalytical attack, at times Rockex was 
physically compromised and was vulnerable to Soviet technical surveillance and side channel 
attacks.  
Before examining the cipher machines it would be helpful to outline the organisational 
structure which supported their development and use in the Cold War. These organisations 
had their origins in the Second World War which transformed official British attitudes 
towards cryptography. Before the war Britain had been slow to adopt cipher machines; the 
Foreign Office had relied on insecure book ciphers and the armed services only began to 
operate their first cipher machine, Typex, in the late 1930s.6 But in the Second World War 
the Sigint bonanza at Bletchley Park powerfully demonstrated the importance of having 
secure ciphers. Furthermore, the British discovered late in the war that some of their own 
manual ciphers had been breached by Germany and Italy.7 As a result in 1944 a Cypher 
Policy Board (CPB) was created to improve British cipher security.8 It was supported by a 
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secretariat which became L Division of GCHQ.9 Post-war cipher machine research and 
development was mainly carried out by the Services Communication Development Unit 
(SCDU), set up in 1946 and based at Dollis Hill in north London.10 The SCDU was staffed by 
personnel from the General Post Office but was under the operational control of a CPB sub-
committee.11 
In 1954 most of L Division’s communications security activities were transferred to a new 
stand-alone body, the London Communications Security Agency (LCSA).12 This new agency 
became responsible for the production of cryptographic equipment and key material and it 
took over control of the SCDU.13 The CPB was replaced by the London Communications 
Security Board which set policy for the LCSA.14 A further reorganisation took place in 1965 
when the LCSA was merged with the SCDU to form the Communications Electronics 
Security Department.15 One constant throughout these organisational reshuffles was the input 
of GCHQ into cipher machine development and operation. Even when the LCSA was spun 
out of GCHQ the Sigint agency continued to provide it with advice, including cryptologic 
designs for new cipher equipment and security assessments.16 This support was significant 
because GCHQ had acquired considerable expertise in breaking the ciphers of other countries 
and could therefore anticipate potential weakness in British cryptographic approaches, 
equipment and procedures. In effect, the poachers were advising the gamekeepers. 
When the Cold War began in 1946-47 the Foreign Office was already bringing into service a 
sophisticated electro-mechanical cipher machine, Rockex, which had been developed during 
the Second World War.17 Rockex relied on the same principle as a manual one-time pad. Put 
simply, in a one-time pad cipher system the message sender and receiver have secret, 
identical key pads with pages of randomly generated numbers. The sender manually 
enciphers the plain text message using the numbers from one page of the key pad and then 
sends the enciphered message with the page number. When the message is received, the 
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receiver deciphers it using the same page from the one-time pad. After the page has been 
used once it is torn out of the key pad and destroyed by both parties – hence the name one-
time pad. If the pages in the one-time pad are not reused and the numbers are truly randomly 
generated, then the enciphered message should be unbreakable through cryptanalysis. 
Rockex worked in a similar fashion but instead of one-time pads it used one-time key tapes 
with randomly generated punched holes.18 A sender would type the plain text of an outward 
message on a teleprinter, producing a punched paper tape. This tape was then passed through 
a Rockex machine concurrently with a key tape. As Rockex mixed the two inputs, the 
teleprinter would print out at high speed an enciphered version of the message. At the 
receiver’s end a tape was automatically prepared as the enciphered message came through. 
This tape was passed through the receiver’s Rockex machine with the same key tape used by 
the sender and the teleprinter would print out a plain text version of the message. Both sender 
and receiver would destroy their key tapes afterwards. In this way two Rockex machines 
could provide the same high level of cryptographic security as a manual one-time pad system 
but could encrypt and decrypt messages far more quickly. 
This combination of speed and security made Rockex very attractive to the Foreign Office 
and when the Rockex Mark II came into production in 1944 it was quickly put to work in 
Britain’s most important and sensitive diplomatic posts.19 Rockex was installed in the 
Washington embassy in October 1944 and the Moscow embassy in July-August 1945.20 With 
the end of the Second World War it was deployed more widely and by 1948 the Foreign 
Office Communications Department had 32 Rockex cipher machines.21 The machine did 
have some drawbacks, however, such as its need for a constant supply of bulky one-time 
tapes which had to be securely stored and disposed of after use. Consequently, despite 
Rockex’s superior speed the Foreign Office maintained manual one-time pads as the 
encryption system for embassies with low volumes of communications traffic.22 
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It soon emerged that there was another, more serious problem with Rockex. The seemingly 
impregnable cipher machine had a technical weakness which could compromise its security. 
In his annual report for the year ending 31 July 1948, the secretary of the CPB explained that: 
It has recently come to light…that the Rockex Mark II produces severe electrical 
radiation which can be readily intercepted in the vicinity of the machine; when 
decyphering, this radiation is such that clear text may be read directly without 
cryptanalysis.23 
What the CPB had come up against was a security issue that would bedevil many countries’ 
cipher machines and other items of electrical equipment in the Cold War. As these devices 
operated they emitted electro-magnetic energy which could radiate in free space for up to a 
half a mile or travel even further if it was induced on nearby conductors like power lines or 
telephone lines.24 If a hostile intelligence service intercepted and analysed these emissions 
from a cipher machine or a teleprinter it could potentially recreate the original plain text of an 
enciphered message, in effect by-passing the cipher. This security issue would later be known 
by the LCSA and NSA as Tempest.25 The Mark I and II models of Rockex appear to have 
been powerful emitters of Tempest radiation; a later NSA paper described them as ‘inherently 
insecure’ and ‘compromised by radiation.’26 
This was a major blow to Britain’s post-war communications security strategy for the CPB 
had envisaged that the Rockex Mark II would carry all the essential traffic of the Foreign 
Office, as well as that of the Chiefs of Staff and GCHQ and perhaps other departments.27 The 
SCDU urgently sought ways to suppress Rockex’s compromising emissions but this proved 
no easy task and in March 1950 the secretary of the CPB warned that Rockex production 
might have to be delayed.28  The CPB asked the Treasury to give the SCDU more staff and a 
larger building because of the extra, unexpected work caused by the Tempest issue.29 By 
1953 the SCDU had developed new versions of Rockex (the Marks III and IV) which the 
British considered more secure.30 But even so, Tempest radiation was a recurring problem for 
Rockex and to some extent limited where it could be used. For example, in 1957 the Foreign 
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Office recommended against installing a Rockex machine in the British embassy in Bangkok 
because of the ‘radiation dangers’.31  
While the Foreign Office grappled with Rockex, Britain’s second diplomatic service, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, made alternative cipher arrangements. The CRO handled 
Britain’s relations with the Commonwealth and had diplomatic missions, called high 
commissions, in Commonwealth countries. For secure communications with its high 
commissions the CRO employed the Typex electro-mechanical cipher machine. Typex had 
been devised just before the Second World War and was based upon early commercial 
versions of the famous German Enigma cipher machine. Like Enigma it used the movement 
of rotors to substitute letters as they were typed into the machine.32 Given that Bletchley Park 
had repeatedly broken Enigma ciphers in the Second World War, the CRO’s reliance on 
Typex in the early Cold War might seem foolhardy but the British had substantially altered 
the device to make it more secure than its German counterpart. For one thing, Typex had 
more rotors than Enigma which meant there were far more potential rotor combinations.33 In 
1946 the British authorities decided to further modify Typex to increase its cryptographic 
strength.34 The rotors and turnover mechanism were redesigned so that all rotors would turn 
as a message was encrypted and the machine was fitted with a pluggable ‘crossover’ at the 
entry and exit to the wiring maze.35 This new version of Typex was ready for service in 
September 1950 and it was predicted that it would provide adequate cipher security for 
another ten years.36 Moreover Typex had the advantage that it was a low emitter of Tempest 
radiation.37 Consequently the CRO decided to use Typex rather than Rockex and it operated 
Typex throughout the 1950s.38 
This decision to stick with Typex had an unfortunate consequence; since Britain’s two 
diplomatic services were operating completely different cipher machine systems it was 
difficult for Foreign Office embassies and CRO high commissions to have direct, secure 
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communication with each other.39 As more British colonies became independent and joined 
the Commonwealth the number of high commissions increased, aggravating the problem of 
inter-communication. In the early 1960s Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Relations 
Secretary, complained several times that it was not possible for him to address Foreign Office 
and CRO posts during his tours overseas without considerable repetition of enciphering.40 
But by this point Typex was already coming to the end of its cryptographic life and the 
Foreign Office was able to convince the CRO to harmonize encryption systems and take on 
Rockex as a partial replacement for Typex.41 From 1964 Rockex was rolled out to selected 
CRO high commissions.42  
In the mid-1960s the CRO and the Foreign Office also began to operate a miniaturised 
version of Rockex called Noreen.43 Noreen used the same one-time key tapes as Rockex and 
the two cipher machines were interoperable. Noreen was however smaller, lighter and more 
portable and with this device the Foreign Office was able to mechanise encryption across its 
embassy network. Once Noreen was cleared for production in 1963 the Foreign Office 
distributed it to smaller diplomatic outposts that had previously depended on one-time pads 
and basic book ciphers.44 As a result, between 1961 and 1965 Foreign Office book cipher 
usage fell from 25% to 3% of all cipher traffic.45 But the Foreign Office also had to equip 
some embassies with Noreen because of what one official called the ’security weaknesses’ of 
Rockex, most likely a reference to its Tempest emissions.46 Noreen seems to have produced 
less compromising Tempest radiation than Rockex – reportedly a Noreen cipher machine did 
not radiate more than four feet.47 In the 1960s it was therefore installed in several embassies 
where the threat of hostile interception and decryption was particularly high, such as in the 
Soviet Bloc capitals Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw.48  
Noreen was not an ideal solution to this security problem though since it was considerably 
slower at enciphering and deciphering than Rockex and unsuitable for posts that had high 
9 
 
volumes of communications traffic.49 What was needed was a device with a greater capacity 
than Noreen but without the technical security weaknesses of Rockex. In the 1960s the 
Foreign Office did have in development the intended successor to Rockex, known as Topic, 
but research on Topic progressed slowly and there were delays in starting production.50 To 
fill the capability gap the Foreign Office decided to buy the Alvis cipher machine which was 
just coming into service with the British military.51 Alvis was a new generation, electronic 
cipher machine that did not require cumbersome one-time key tapes.52 Unlike Britain’s 
earlier cipher machines, it had been developed in cooperation with the United States; 
according to Robert Stannard, the Director of the LCSA, the cryptologic principle behind 
Alvis was ‘jointly UK/US’ and the machines’ original cryptologic and technical 
specifications relied in part on American ideas.53 The Treasury agreed that the Foreign Office 
could purchase Alvis for posts where there were good operational security reasons for 
replacing Rockex before Topic became available.54 In practice, the Foreign Office and CRO 
seem to have deployed Alvis more widely as a general replacement for Rockex. Alvis was 
installed in Paris, Bonn and Berlin in 1965, in Washington and Ottawa in 1966 and by 1970 it 
was present at the Moscow embassy.55 It was planned that by 1974 77 British diplomatic 
posts would be using Alvis and 61 Noreen.56 Just two posts, Muscat and Aden, would be left 
with Rockex. 
The Foreign Office and the CRO were not the only users of Typex, Rockex, Noreen and 
Alvis for these cipher machines were also sold to Commonwealth countries, most notably 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These states were part of a Sigint alliance with Britain 
and the United States based around the 1954 United Kingdom-United States (UKUSA) 
agreement and the UKUSA partners closely cooperated in communications security.57 It 
therefore made sense for Britain to supply Australia, Canada and New Zealand with its most 
secure cipher technology. The Australian Department of External Affairs (DEA) was able to 
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buy British Typex Mark 22 cipher machines and it installed Typex at its embassy in 
Washington and other diplomatic posts.58 In the 1950s the DEA started to use Rockex and in 
the 1960s it acquired Noreen and Alvis.59 Canada followed a similar pattern although it 
adopted Rockex earlier; by 1949 the Canadian Department of External Affairs already had 13 
Rockex Mark IIs.60 New Zealand operated Typex and probably Rockex.61 Britain and its 
three Commonwealth allies shared the burden of maintaining their cipher machines around 
the world. For example, the CRO’s Typex and Rockex machines in Ottawa, Canberra and 
Wellington were serviced by the host nations while the British Air Ministry looked after 
Australian and New Zealand machines in London.62  
London also released Typex to new Commonwealth countries which were not part of the 
select UKUSA group. When British colonies achieved independence after 1945 London 
supplied them with cipher equipment to secure their communications and maintain 
compatible cipher services within the Commonwealth.63 Typex cipher machines were sold at 
below cost price to newly independent India, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Malaya.64 Yet these 
countries were treated differently to the UKUSA allies; while Britain in 1949 was willing to 
provide Australia with the Typex Mark 22, this model was not be for sale to India.65 The 
Indians would continue to use the older, less secure Mark II version of Typex and would not 
even be informed of the Mark 22.  In the mid-1960s the British government abandoned its 
policy of supplying cipher machines and cryptographic information to the new 
Commonwealth states, probably for cost reasons.66  
Typex, Rockex and Noreen provided Britain and its Commonwealth allies with fast machine 
encryption and speeded up diplomatic communications, with embassies and high 
commissions able to handle a much greater volume of encrypted messages than before. What 
remains to be determined though is whether these cipher machines protected Britain’s 
diplomatic messages from hostile decryption. The Sigint directorate of the Soviet KGB and 
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its predecessors in the NKVD, NKGB and MGB repeatedly targeted Foreign Office 
communications and it is likely that many other countries tried to solve British ciphers during 
the early Cold War.67 With currently available sources it is difficult to assess how successful 
they were as the British government has not revealed whether any of its ciphers were broken 
and foreign intelligence services have not trumpeted any victories. A KGB officer, Yuri 
Noskeno, who defected to the United States in 1964, did report that there were ‘some 
successes’ in decrypting British communications but he could not remember any specific 
examples and may not have been referring to machine encrypted diplomatic traffic.68    
It is possible though to examine the ways in which foreign intelligence services (and 
especially the KGB) might have attacked the ciphers and look for any obvious failings in 
British cryptographic security. There were three main approaches that an intelligence service 
could have taken at this time: it could intercept British diplomatic telegrams and seek to solve 
the cipher through pure cryptanalysis, applying mathematical techniques and linguistic 
analysis; it could try to obtain the cipher machines and cryptographic materials, such as key 
lists and key tapes. Or if it was sufficiently technologically advanced, it could carry out side 
channel attacks that used emissions from the machines, such as Tempest radiation and 
acoustic signatures, to reconstruct the message. These approaches could be complementary, 
as information from seized or stolen cryptographic material and analysis of Tempest radiation 
might aid the mathematicians and linguists working on the cipher.  
In the first case, British officials were convinced that the Rockex and Noreen ciphers could 
not be solved through pure cryptanalysis because they were one-time machines. A CRO 
cipher official wrote in 1960 that ‘Rockex is “one-time” and, therefore, 100% secure against 
cryptanalysis’.69 The Typex cipher was theoretically solvable but the Germans had been 
unable to break Typex in World War Two and the Mark 22 version generated an even 
stronger cipher.70 Consequently, the CRO thought that Typex was ‘99.9% secure’ against 
12 
 
cryptanalysis.71 Of course, human error could weaken the security of even the strongest 
cipher machine and on occasion cipher clerks did accidentally reuse a Rockex key tape to 
encipher a second telegram, which made the two messages concerned vulnerable to 
decryption.72 But short of this type of operator error, the British authorities believed that their 
machine ciphers could withstand a purely cryptanalytic attack. Any intelligence agency 
seeking to break the cipher would need help from other sources. A LCSA paper in 1956 
confidently stated that:  
The security of modern general purpose crypto systems is so high that 
cryptanalytical success against them will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
If an enemy is to succeed in breaking our cypher messages he will therefore 
depend for success on “pinching” some or all of the key data.73 
 
‘Pinching’ was a term used at Bletchley Park in World War 2 to describe Allied seizures of 
Enigma cipher machines and cryptographic material, like codebooks, manuals and key 
settings, in raids on German ships and submarines.74 It was obviously not possible to carry 
out such military attacks in peace time but in the early Cold War three British embassies were 
overrun by rioters (Baghdad in 1958, Jakarta in 1963 and Beijing in 1967) and these security 
breaches could have provided opportunities for the local intelligence services to ‘pinch’ 
cryptographic material and cipher machines. Furthermore, in 1964 Soviet fireman entered 
Britain’s Moscow embassy and in 1961 Egyptian protestors invaded the Canadian embassy in 
Cairo, which operated Rockex. In most of these cases the embassy staff managed to stop 
cryptographic material and cipher machines from falling into hostile hands. The cipher 
machines were destroyed in Baghdad and in the Moscow embassy fire the cipher clerks 
prevented the Soviet ‘firemen’, who were presumed to be KGB personnel, from forcing their 
way into the code room.75 In Cairo the protestors did not reach the embassy communications 
centre although the Canadians started to destroy the Rockex key tapes and documents.76  
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In Jakarta things were more difficult. Indonesian protestors ransacked and set alight the 
British embassy on 18 September 1963 but the staff were able to carry the cipher machines 
and cryptographic material to the strong room before they could be seized by the rioters. The 
ambassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, returned to the gutted embassy on 23 September and 
found that the Indonesians were trying to break into the strong room.77 While Gilchrist 
remonstrated with the Indonesians Western diplomats slipped into the strong room, removed 
some of the most sensitive documents and ‘did strategic damage to [the] code machines’.78 
The next day, amidst rumours that the Indonesian army cipher expert, Brigadier-General 
Rubiono Kertosati, was in the building, the British and Americans used trucks to transfer all 
the material from the still locked strong room to the safety of the American embassy.79 
Britain’s luck finally ran out in Beijing in 1967.80 China was then in the turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution and Britain had become the focus of the revolutionaries’ anger because 
of its colonial control over Hong Kong. On 22 August 1967 thousands of Red Guards 
stormed the British embassy and amongst them were Chinese cipher experts who knew where 
the code machines were located in the mission.81 Although the embassy staff carried out their 
emergency procedures they did not have enough time to destroy one Rockex cipher machine 
or move it to the strong room and the machine was captured by the Chinese.82 It is not clear 
how serious a security breach this was. Without the key tapes it would have been impossible 
for the Chinese to read the Rockex’s messages and one of the British diplomats in the 
embassy, John Weston, later recalled that although they lost the cipher machine, ‘[m]ost of 
the other stuff we didn’t want the Chinese to get, we…succeeded in putting behind the 
strong-room doors’.83 This suggests that the key tapes and other cryptographic material may 
have been secured in time.84 Like the Indonesians the Chinese did try to break into the strong 
room but they were unable to penetrate its nine-inch thick steel doors.85 Nevertheless, 
possession of the Rockex would have given Chinese cryptanalysts an opportunity to study 
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how the machine operated, understand its cryptologic principles and look for weaknesses that 
could be used in side channel attacks. The official instructions for the emergency destruction 
of Rockex warned that ‘it is of the greatest importance to deny to any foreign power 
knowledge of how the machine works and, in particular, the precautionary measures taken to 
ensure that no spurious radiation is present.’86 The concern seems to have been that an enemy 
like China might find ways to exploit Rockex’s Tempest emissions.  
Espionage was another, less dramatic way for opponents to ‘pinch’ cryptographic materials 
and gain information on cipher machines. Foreign intelligence agencies could recruit or insert 
agents in the British diplomatic services and their overseas missions. Soviet espionage 
especially had been a major problem for the Foreign Office in the past. During the 1930s the 
NKVD recruited two cipher clerks in the Foreign Office Communications Department, Ernest 
Oldham and John King, who gave them information about Foreign Office book ciphers.87 
Burdened with guilt, Oldham committed suicide in 1933 and after King was discovered and 
jailed in 1939, the Foreign Office cleaned house by replacing all the staff in the 
Communications Department.88 But despite this the Soviets still had active agents in the 
Foreign Office in the early Cold War and at least two of these, Donald Maclean and Leonard 
Hinchcliffe, could access cipher machines and cryptographic materials.  
Maclean was recruited by the Soviets while still a student at Cambridge University in 1934 
and under their direction he worked in the Foreign Office from 1935 until 1951 with access to 
highly sensitive top secret documents.89 He was eventually unmasked by an Anglo-American 
Sigint operation, code named VENONA, that analysed encrypted messages in the Second 
World War between Moscow and the NKVD/NKGB stations in the Soviet diplomatic 
missions in Washington and New York.90 Maclean had served in Britain’s Washington 
embassy between 1944 and 1948 and a handful of the decrypted VENONA telegrams from 
1944 and 1945 reported the activities of a Soviet agent codenamed HOMER, who was 
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identified as Maclean. Unfortunately, Maclean was tipped off before he could be questioned 
by the British security services and he defected to the Soviet Union in May 1951.  
The VENONA decrypts did not show HOMER passing cipher secrets to the Soviets but the 
Americans only managed to intercept and decipher a small fraction of the traffic between 
Moscow and the NKVD/NKGB in Washington and New York.91 There may have been other 
NKVD/NKGB telegrams which did contain or refer to cryptographic material supplied by 
Maclean while he worked at the embassy in Washington. British and American officials 
believed that Maclean had given the Soviets cipher information; the former MI5 officer Peter 
Wright claimed in his memoirs that Maclean had ‘betrayed every code he had access to in the 
Foreign Office.’92 A damage assessment for the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1955 
concluded that because of the espionage of Maclean and his accomplice Guy Burgess, ‘all 
U.K. and possibly some U.S. diplomatic codes and ciphers in existence prior to 25 May 1951 
are in possession of the Soviets and of no further use.’93  
The Joint Chiefs’ assessment is puzzling and perhaps overly alarmist for if fresh manual one-
time pads and Rockex key tapes were issued, these forms of encryption should have stayed 
secure no matter Maclean what had done.94 Yet it is possible that Maclean compromised 
Rockex. He was First Secretary at the Washington embassy and acting Head of Chancery 
from May to November 1946.95 According to an internal NSA history as part of his duties he 
‘was in charge of the coderoom in Washington.’96 This was particularly significant for the 
Foreign Office had installed its first Rockex in the Washington embassy in October 1944. 
Maclean was therefore perfectly placed to report to his controllers in Moscow on Britain’s 
brand new Rockex cipher machine. He could inform them how it operated, take photographs 
and steal or copy key tapes, operating manuals and encrypted and plaintext telegrams. This 
would have given the Soviets an early start in devising ways to circumvent the Rockex’s one-
time cipher through technical surveillance and side channel attacks.  
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Hinchcliffe seems to have been a less serious case. He worked as an Assistant Administrative 
Officer at the British embassy in Khartoum and was blackmailed and bribed into acting as a 
Soviet agent between March 1970 and April 1971.97 As well as giving the KGB Foreign 
Office documents he provided information about the embassy’s cipher machines. Hinchcliffe 
told his contact the type of machine that the embassy operated and handed over a section of a 
cipher key that had been used to encrypt a telegram together with the plain text of the 
telegram and part of the encrypted text. However, Hinchcliffe was a reluctant spy and when 
he began a new posting in the Algiers embassy he confessed his past treachery to the British 
ambassador. At his subsequent trial in Britain the judge gave Hinchcliffe a reduced sentence, 
partly because he had only supplied his Soviet handler with ‘material of a lower grade’ and 
not the higher grade material that had also been available to him.98 The cipher key, plaintext 
and encrypted text would have helped the Soviets understand how the embassy’s cipher 
system functioned and identify it in other encrypted telegrams but it would not have given 
them a general solution to the cipher.99  
Probably the most significant threat to Britain’s machine ciphers came from Soviet technical 
surveillance and side channel attacks. By the 1950s the Soviets were using Tempest radiation 
to recreate the plain text from cipher machines and they could also exploit the sounds that the 
machines produced.100 By monitoring the noises produced by the relays, switches, contacts 
and other components of a cipher machine, cryptanalysts could gather valuable information 
on the mechanism’s workings.101 Moreover, each key on the cipher machine key board might 
have a different acoustic signature when pressed and if a microphone was sensitive enough to 
pick up the differences between them, it would be possible to reconstruct a message typed 
into the cipher machine. The Soviets grouped these acoustic emissions and Tempest radiation 
as one information source and gave it the acronym PEMNI (Collateral Electromagnetic 
Emanation and Acoustic Emission).102 The KGB was adept at using PEMNI to by-pass 
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sophisticated machine ciphers. When a new American embassy was constructed in Moscow 
in 1953 the Soviets secretly embedded 52 microphones in it and set a large metal grill in the 
ceiling of a room near the State Department communications centre with co-axial cables 
running off, possibly to detect Tempest radiation.103 By analysing the PEMNI emissions a 
KGB team in 1959 could partially read the encrypted traffic of the embassy.104 The KGB may 
have been reading the American communications earlier as embassy telegrams were listed 
among documents distributed to the Soviet Presidium in 1956.105 
This raises the question of whether the KGB also mounted a PEMNI attack on the Rockex 
machines which had been in Britain’s Moscow embassy since summer 1945. As yet, there is 
no evidence that the Soviets targeted the machines’ Tempest radiation but they were able to 
plant bugs in the embassy. A security sweep in October 1959 uncovered three microphones in 
the building including one hidden in what had formerly been the cipher room.106 The Soviets 
were thought to have installed the bugging system sometime between 1941 and 1943 when 
the diplomatic staff were temporarily evacuated from Moscow. The British authorities feared 
that the cipher room microphone may have enabled the Soviets to read the embassy’s 
telegrams and they set up a working party to investigate.107 In August 1960 the prime 
minister was advised that: 
…the Working Party concludes that (except during periods between 1945 and 
mid-1947 and November 1953 and January 1954 when the cypher room was 
elsewhere) information classified up to and including Top Secret was 
intermittently compromised from October 1943 until early in 1954, and to a lesser 
extent from then until late 1958. From that date until the discovery of the 
microphones in October 1959 the damage to classified information arose only 
from possible lapses of speech security due to human error and is likely to have 
been slight.108 
The implication here is that the embassy’s Rockex cipher machines were compromised by the 
bugging. Until KGB archives are opened, there is no way to confirm whether the Soviets 
could reconstruct the plain text of embassy telegrams from sounds captured by the 
microphone but considering the KGB’s success against the American embassy, it does seem 
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possible.109 It is notable that the Canadian embassy in Moscow, which operated either 
Rockex or Typex, also suffered a cipher breach in the early 1960s.110 An agent in the 
embassy passed on cipher information to the KGB and planted bugs in the communications 
room which enabled the Soviets to intercept and decrypt every message passing between 
Moscow and Ottawa. 
The discovery of the microphones in the British embassy drove the Foreign Office to take 
further action to protect its cipher machines from technical surveillance and side channel 
attacks. It built a special safe room in the Moscow embassy to house the cipher machines 
there and during the 1960s it constructed a further 24 cipher safe rooms in embassies where 
there was a high risk of technical surveillance.111 As well as being sound proofed, these 
rooms were shielded to prevent the leakage of any Tempest radiation.112 There was palpable 
nervousness in the Foreign Office about hostile technical surveillance of Rockex in posts 
without safe rooms. In 1968 the Foreign Office Security Department wanted to replace 
Rockex in Ankara, Bahrain and Rawalpindi ‘as soon as possible, because of the technical 
insecurity associated with that system.’113 The following year the Foreign Office instructed 
the British high commission in Wellington to revert back to using ‘book cyphers’ (most likely 
one-time pads) after an inspection found that the commission’s Rockex cipher machines were 
emitting Tempest radiation well beyond the walls and ceiling of the cipher room.114 For the 
Foreign Office the general replacement of Rockex by Alvis could not come soon enough.  
The early Cold War was a period of transition for British communications security and 
cryptography. The Foreign Office and CRO moved away from time consuming manual 
ciphers and switched to mechanised encryption across their networks of embassies and high 
commissions. Enciphering and deciphering messages became quicker as a result and this 
helped speed up communications between London and its diplomatic missions. Cipher 
machine technology also rapidly advanced from rotor machines like Typex to the Rockex and 
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Noreen one-time tape machines and finally to Alvis, a tapeless, rotorless, transistor based 
device. These were technologically advanced, sophisticated cipher machines, equal to some 
of the best in the world and their development meant that in the early Cold War the Foreign 
Office’s diplomatic communications were protected by far stronger cryptographic systems 
than in the 1930s. Indeed, the British were confident that some of their machine ciphers were 
unsolvable by pure cryptanalysis.  
This did not necessarily mean though that British cipher machines provided complete security 
and secrecy for diplomatic communications. The danger came from physical compromise of 
cipher systems, technical surveillance and side channel attacks and in these areas Britain did 
have some failures in the early Cold War.  It lost a Rockex in Beijing in 1967 and the Soviet 
agents Maclean and Hinchcliffe had free access to cipher machines and cryptographic 
material. Rockex had an extremely strong cipher but at the same time it was highly 
vulnerable to technical surveillance of its Tempest radiation and acoustic emissions. By 
bugging Britain’s Moscow embassy the Soviets seem to have been able to read the diplomatic 
traffic enciphered and deciphered by the Rockex machines there in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.  
Yet complete communications security is perhaps impossible to achieve, particularly over a 
25-year period, and Britain did not fare comparatively worse than some of its UKUSA 
partners. The United States and Canada also suffered from Soviet espionage and had their 
diplomatic ciphers broken through the bugging of embassies in Moscow. The United States 
had cryptographic material snatched from its embassy in Taipei in 1957 when it was stormed 
by protestors.115 Rockex’s Tempest radiation was a weak point but the British did discover 
this vulnerability early on and took a series of counter measures. They modified Rockex to 
reduce the emissions, limited which embassies it was deployed in, employed Noreen as a 
partial replacement and built safe rooms to shield it from Tempest and acoustic attacks. Other 
20 
 
countries were much slower in discovering Tempest radiation and their cipher machines 
remained unprotected, which was something that GCHQ itself exploited. Peter Wright 
recounted in his memoirs how GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 used Tempest radiation to break the 
diplomatic ciphers of France and other states in the 1960s.116 So while Britain’s cipher 
security record in the early Cold War was not perfect, it did secure its diplomatic secrets 
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